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I have been a professor for over sixteen years. For that entire time (and,
indeed, for years before that)' legal education has been under attack for a va-
riety of reasons, not the least of which is the allegation that it has led to the
law becoming "divorced from society and life," and to the sever[ing of the]
connections between the study of law and American political, social, and
economic policies."2 Legal education has been criticized for ignoring stu-
dents' need for feedback, ' for class size,4 for "failing to teach students many
" Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Rutgers University, J.D., Columbia
University Law School. This article is an expanded version of a presentation made to the Cali-
fornia Western School of Law faculty in February 1999, and has been further informed by the
author's attendance at the Creative Problem Solving conference in February 2000.
1. See James Rowles, Toward Balancing the Goals of Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 375, 394 (1981) (tracing student criticism of legal education to the 1930s); see also
Timothy Floyd, Legal Education and the Vision Thing, 31 GA. L. REV. 853, 867 (1997) (argu-
ing legal education has been criticized "for decades"). For an early critique of legal education
in the United States, see ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW
416-20 (1921). Of course, legal education has been criticized since Blackstone's time. See
David Lemmings, Blackstone and Law Reform by Education: Preparation for the Bar and
Lawyerly Culture in Eighteenth-century England, 16 LAw & HIST. REV. 211, 213 (1998)
("Blackstone himself admitted that the 'usual entrance on the study of the law' provided the
student with 'no public direction in what course to pursue his inquiries,' and complained, 'In
this situation he is expected to sequester himself from the world, and by a tedious lonely
process to extract the law from a mass of undigested learning."').
2. Paula Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema Verite
and the Penology of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 347, 403 (1996). For a sampling of
the literature, see e.g., Gregory Crespi, Comparing United States And New Zealand Legal
Education: Are U.S. Law Schools Too Good?, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 31, 32, 32 n.1
(1997) (citing, inter alia, Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1921 (1993));
Symposium, Civic and Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1525 (1993); Symposium, The
Justice Mission of American Law Schools, 40 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 277 (1992); Legal Education
and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC.
& ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]).
3. See, e.g., B.A. Glessner, Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 CONN. L. REV.
627, 646, 657-58 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Sarah E. Theimann, Beyond Guinier: A Critique of Legal Pedagogy, 24
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of the practical lawyering skills they will need in practice," 5 and for "warp-
ing personalities, undermining ethical and social values, and fostering cyni-
cism in students."6 Law school has also been criticized for inducing and in-
creasing psychological distress in law students.7 Research concludes that law
students "are much more likely than the general population to experience
emotional distress, depression, anxiety, addictions, and other related mental,
physical and social problems."8 A recent article presented this gloomy sum-
mary:
Students also report extreme self-punishing attitudes, obsessive
self-doubt, apathy, withdrawal from normal activities, fear, apprehen-
sion, a sense of impending doom, and panic attacks. Some students
report vivid, catastrophic images of, for example, losing control and
running out of final examinations. Interpersonal relationships with
family members or significant others often are strained, and relation-
ships with other students are often characterized by enmity, hostility,
and overt contempt. 9
In response, observers have called for substantial changes in "core and
elective curricula, legal writing programs, clinical and other 'skills' -training
programs, instruction in values and ethics, admissions criteria, financial aid
programs, faculty recruitment and evaluation policies, and other aspects of
law school operation."10
There is, I agree, much merit to many of these charges. Yet, little atten-
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 17,24-26 (1998).
5. James Eagar, The Right Tool for the Job: The Effective Use of Pedagogical Methods in
Legal Education, 32 GoNz. L. REv. 389, 392 (1996-97).
6. Suzanne Segerstrom, Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law
School, 32 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 593, 593 (1996) (citing Ronald M. Pipkin, Legal Education:
The Consumer's Perspective, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J., 1161, 1163 (Fall 1976)). See also James
B. Taylor, Law School Stress and the "Deformation Professionelle," 27 J. LEGAL EDtic. 251,
251 (1975).
7. See Segerstrom, supra note 6, at 593-96 (citing Glesner, supra note 3, at 628; Taylor,
supra note 6, at 253; Stephen B. Shanfield & G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Psychiatric Distress in
Law Students, 35 J. LEGAL EDuc. 65, 65 (1985); G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of
Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers,
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J., 225, 225-26 (Spring 1986); Faith Dickerson, Psychological Counsel-
ing for Law Students: One Law School's Experience, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 82, 82 (1987)). See
also Ann lijima, Lessons Learned: Legal Education and Law Student Dysfunction, 48 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 524, 525-26 (1998) (citing studies that revealed that law students were "within
normal psychological ranges when they started law school but became disproportionately dys-
functional soon thereafter, and experienced increasing dysfunction as they progressed through
their legal education.").
8. Lawrence Krieger, What We're Not Telling Law Student-and Lawyers-That They
Really Need to Know: Some Thoughts-in-Action Toward Revitalizing the Profession from Its
Roots, 13 J. L. & HEALTH 1, 4 (1998-99).
9. Sengstrom, supra note 6, at 594-95 (citing Barry B. Boyer & Roger C. Cramton,
American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221,
264 (1974)).
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tion has been paid to another shortcoming of legal education that, in the long
run, may be as serious as any of those that have been more frequently dis-
cussed: the academy's failure to think seriously about how the process of le-
gal education leads students to make short-sighted, narrow, and even self-
destructive assumptions about both the legal process and the act of lawyer-
ing.
Prior to becoming a professor, I spent thirteen years in public interest
law, representing a variety of individuals" who fall-globally-into the
Carolene Products footnote four category of "discrete and insular minori-
ties... [upon whom prejudice acts ] ... to curtail the operation of those po-
litical processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."" For my
first six years of teaching, I directed New York Law School's Federal Litiga-
tion Clinic, and, in that role, supervised students who represented persons
with physical and mental disabilities in Supplemental Security Income, Sup-
plemental Security Disability Income, and special education cases. Since
that time, I have biannually taught a course entitled Mental Disability Litiga-
tion Seminar and Workshop, through which students are assigned to a public
agency or public interest law office and-under the aegis of a mentor-
attorney-provide representation to persons with mental disabilities or to
agencies that administer programs providing services to such persons. 4 I
also regularly supervise students in externship programs in a wide variety of
public and private law settings.
In addition, of course, I teach "regular" law school courses: Civil Proce-
dure, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure: Adjuducation, and three other
mental disability law courses (Mental Health Law, Criminal Law and Proce-
dure: The Mentally Disabled Defendant, and Seminar in Therapeutic Juris-
prudence). In these courses, I use a variety of teaching methods," but the
11. I was for three years Deputy Public Defender in charge of the Mercer County (Tren-
ton) NJ Office of the Public Defender, for eight, the Director of the Division of Mental Health
Advocacy in the NJ Department of the Public Advocate, and for two Special Counsel to the
Commissioner of the NJ Department of the Public Advocate.
12. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). For a discus-
sion on the impact this footnote had on the development of judicial activist protection of mi-
norities (including mental disability law), see 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY
LAw: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 1-2. 1, at 7-8 (2d ed. 1998), and Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism",
46 SMU L. REv. 373, 380-81 n.51 (1992).
13. For a sampling of cases, see, e.g., Tirado v. Bowen, 705 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Alvarez v. Bowen, 704 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Baran v. Bowen, 710 F. Supp. 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Mejia v. Bowen, 1988 WL 125678 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Tirado v. Bowen, 842
F. 2d 595 (2d Cir. 1988).
14. See Keni K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, "Johnny's in the Basement/Mixing Up His
Medicine": Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forth-
ooming 2000) (manuscript at 5, on file with authors).
15. I use videotape simulations in Mental Health Law and in Criminal Law and Proce-
dure: The Mentally Disabled Defendant that include counseling, trial and witness preparation
vignettes. I regularly assign students to do oral trial and appellate arguments in both courses,
and I also assign GERALD STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976) to my Civil Proce-
dure students, STEPHEN PHILLIPS, No HEROES, No VILLIANS: THE STORY OF A MURDER TRIAL
20001
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majority of the class time is still spent talking about cases16 in which I ask
students lots of questions and they give me lots of answers, and, with that
method, we both (hopefully) learn something more about the underlying ma-
terial. I've come to a few conclusions about the teaching enterprise, and
these conclusions are the focus of this article.
My thesis is as follows: We have, blindly, spent the past century locked
into a method of legal education that may or may not have worked at Har-
vard in the 19th century, but which is increasingly irrelevant to the needs of
lawyers and clients in 2 1st century America.
Our slavish adherence to the "case law method"-while doing a fine job
in preparing a certain percentage of our students' for becoming top-notch ap-
pellate litigators-fails miserably in most other ways.17 Additionally, of spe-
cific moment in light of California Western's focus on creative problem
solving, I believe that the dominance of the case method as a teaching mode
has a subtle, but corrosive, impact on the way our students practice when
they graduate. It also affects the quality and range of legal services these fu-
ture lawyers provide, and, not unimportantly, their level of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the practice of law.
(1978) to my Criminal Procedure students, and PAUL ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT?
(2000) to my Criminal Law students.
I now also teach an Internet-based distance learning course in Mental Disability Law under
the auspices of New York Law School and Compass Knowledge, Inc. This is, to the best of
my knowledge, the first online mental disability law course ever offered by an accredited law
school. See Juris Alliance, Mental Disability Law Certificate Program (visited June, 2000)
<http://www.jurisalliance.comlmdl>.
16. Not the Professor Kingsfield model of cinematic Paper Chase fame, of course. See
Pamela Smith, Teaching the Retrenchment Generation: When Sapphire Meets Socrates at the
Intersection of Race, Gender, and Authority, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 53, 159-60
(1999):
I attempt to eliminate as much fear as possible. I try to remove from students the
fear that I will be a professor in the likeness of Professor Kingsfield from the
movie The Paper Chase or that I am a Socratic Monster, i.e., one of those 'profes-
sors who don't actually teach. They instill fear. Armed with students' names and
seating charts, they have the class at their mercy, and they love it. They can sense
fear. Never ask these teachers a question; they will make you answer it.' Unlike
the expected Socratic professorial Monster, I like to think my approach to teaching
is more student-friendly; it is not designed or implemented to instill fear or to
intimidate.
17. For an important early criticism, see Jerome Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal
Education? 19 A.B.A. J. 723 (1933). For more contemporary criticisms, see, e.g., Myron
Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method It's Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC.
241 (1992); Russell Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L.
REV. 517, 561-66 (1991). For a powerful critique of the pedagogical assumptions implicit in
the Socratic method, see Susan H. Williams, Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology, and
the Socratic Method, 45 STAN L. REV. 1571, 1573-75 (1993). At least one critic has con-
cluded that the Socratic method is not the only (and perhaps not the main) villain. See Seger-
strom, supra note 6, at 596 ("However, law students experience a number of different stress-
ors unrelated to the Socratic method (e.g., time pressure), and these other stressors may have
more impact on law students than the Socratic method.").
[Vol. 37
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The case method-which, among other things, denies that we all have
right brains as well as left brains'--allows us to (indeed, forces us to) ignore
much of what is most important about legal education.
* First, it allows us-indeed, forces us-to ignore everything
about a case other than that which the appellate court chooses to
share with us.
* It allows us-indeed, forces us-to ignore everything about the
parties before the court that happened before the "critical mo-
ment" that led to the litigation or happened after the court's
judgment.
* It allows us-indeed, forces us-to ignore everything about
other parties who may not have been part of the litigation but
were of critical importance to the incident or event that led to
the litigation.
* It allows us-indeed, forces us-to ignore everything about
what impact the litigation actually had on the individuals who
were subject to it.
And there's more: 9 the case method shows students how a collection of
individual cases develops into a coherent body of law (allegedly), and how
doctrines in criminal law, torts, or other first year courses emerge from the
individual cases. Yet, the case method tells us nothing about the impact of
the doctrine developed in case #1 on the parties in case #2, case #100, or
case #n.
I expect that the reason why this is so is that much of the law continues
to be based on the shaky house of cards that are called "neutral principles."'2
As I will discuss, I believe that this adherence is a sham. After thirteen years
as a "real lawyer" 2-at every level of court from the Trenton Municipal
18. See, e.g., SALLY SPRINGER & GEORG DEUTSCH, LEFr BRAIN, RIGHT BRAIN 184-87,
190-92 (1993).
19. See also David Barnhizer, Princes of Darkness and Angels of Light: The Soul of the
American Lawyer, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 371, 471 (2000) ("Nothing in
legal education prepares the prospective law graduate for the responsible use of power or the
need for accountability.").
20. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959). I critique this assumption in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by
the Hour": Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 947,
975-76 (1997):
This approach, of course, assumes a fact not in evidence: that judges and fact find-
ers are able to approach cases analytically with the sort of 'reasoned elaboration'
and 'neutrality' urged by Wechsler and his adherents. An examination of the de-
velopment of mental disability law jurisprudence suggests that 'neutral principles'
are simply not a factor in the case law in this area. Rather, the twin themes of 'san-
ism' and 'pretextuality' dominate the mental disability law landscape.
I discuss the meaning and significance of "sanism" and "pretextuality" in, inter alia, MICHAEL
L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000).
21. See Patrick Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: the Elite Law Finn, the Elite Law
School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REv. 705, 777 (1998)
20001
5
Perlin: Symposium: Creative Problem Solving Conference -- Stepping Outsid
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Court to the United States Supreme Court-a few points are clear to me.
Judges are not neutral. Jurors are not neutral. None of us is, truly, neutral.
And our dogged insistence on retaining this doctrine of the case method as a
major piece of legal education exposes the shallowness of much of our ef-
fort.
The case method presupposes that we are rational. It presupposes that
lawyers are rational, that individual fact-finders are rational, that appellate
judges are rational. At best, that's just plain silly;22 at worst, it exposes the
pretextual basis of much of the legal system. 3
Finally, I want to offer an alternative approach-some creative problem
solving, perhaps-to much of this. I want to focus on therapeutic jurispru-
dence as a tool to inform classroom teaching and classroom discourse, and
as, perhaps, a redemptive tool to help legal education prepare for the next
century. For it is only through a new approach to legal education that law-
yers-the current law students-will "get" what they must "get" in order to
be complete lawyers. It is only in that way that these lawyers will be able to
see their clients in a new light, and not simply as examples of "slip and falls"
or "dart outs" (choose the shorthand of the substantive legal area of your
choice), but as individuals who require the individualized presentation of
creative and individualized legal services.
My article will thus proceed in this way. Part II continues my critique of
the case method. Part III discusses the connection between what we learn
(and how we learn it) and what we subsequently do. I will then, in Part IV,
briefly apply some Creative Problem Solving (CPS) ideas to the teaching en-
terprise, as a means of "stepping outside of the box."' Finally, I will offer
(quoting Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 411.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 8 (1991)):
Over the next three years, the law student will spend literally hundreds of hours
with her professors. Her professors will be the most important-perhaps the
only-professional role models that she will have during this formative stage of
her career. Her professors will influence her in the readings that they assign, in the
hypotheticals that they invent, in the war stories that they tell, and in the comments
that they make in class. In all these ways, we professors "convey notions of who
we think the 'real lawyers' are."
In my 25 years of presenting CLE programs and workshops to forensic psychologists and
psychiatrists, there has been one constant: when I point out to my audience that I spent 13
years as a "real lawyer," attendees begin to listen to me in a very different (and much more
careful) way. The same thing frequently happens when I'm giving a job reference over the
telephone.
22. See Perlin, supra note 12, at 374; see generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes
ed., 1999) (asserting, through thirteen different essays, that emotions and passions-from dis-
gust to a desire for revenge-pervade the law).
23. See generally PERLIN, supra note 20 (arguing throughout book that pretextuality, and
its maddening grasp on the legal system, has controlled-and continues to control-modem
mental disability law). I define 'pretextuality' infra at text accompanying notes 46-47.
24. On how legal thinking is often "boxed in" by old paradigms, see, e.g., David Ken-
nedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335,
456-57 (2000); Michaela Moore, Thinking Outside the Box: A Negotiated Settlement Agree-
[Vol. 37
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some recommendations for the future.
II. CASE METHOD CRITIQUE
In 1870, Dean Langdell envisioned the case method as a scientific
means of using appellate cases to distill legal principles in a way that em-
phasized-almost to the exclusion of all other modes of instruction-
reasoning skills. He emphasized that a faculty experienced in practicing law
was a sign of "law school poverty," and was clear as to his biases: "What
qualifies a person... to teach law is not experience in the work of a law-
yer's office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience in the trial
or argument of causes, not experience, in short, in using law, but experience
in learning law."'
I acknowledge that the "Socratic Method" does an excellent job of
teaching analytical skills and of enabling students to synthesize multiple
conceptsY I believe, however, as a method, it falls short-seriously short-
in other areas.28
The Socratic Method has the potential to be aggressive, demeaning,
emotionally destructive, authoritarian and brutal. It also wastes a lot of time.
Beyond this-and perhaps just as importantly-it is simply unadaptable to
do the job of preparing students for the practice of law in just about every
other area except for case analysis (which it does well). The Method falls
short in these areas:29
- teaching lawyering skills (fact-investigation, planning, drafting, re-
search, trial strategy and tactics, and advocacy);
- teaching human relation skills (interviewing, counseling, negotiating,
communications, and emotional understanding in general);
- teaching the ethical and social responsibilities of the profession;
ment for the Remediation of the General Electric/Housatonic River Site Ensures Environ-
mental Health and Economic Prosperity for Pittsfield, Massachusetts, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 577, 616-17 (1999).
25. George S. Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL
BDUc. 162, 164 (1974).
26. Christopher C. Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 L.Q.R. 123, 124 (1887);
see also ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO
THE 1980s, at 38 (1983) (explaining that not only did Langdell feel that a case-driven teaching
method must be insulated from practical experience, but also that any invasion of such ex-
perience into this method would "sully its purity").
27. On whether the phrase "Socratic method" even describes the style of classroom
teaching reflected in the case method, see Richard Neumann, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into
the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 725, 729-30 (1989) (concluding that this method is not
Socratic).
28. For a full analysis, see Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard,
78 NEB. L. REv. 113, 118-22 (1999). On other alternative teaching methods, see, e.g., Steven
Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in American Law Schools, 20
SEATTLEU. L. REV. 1 (1996).
29. On how it falls short in teaching professional judgment, see Paul Brest & Linda
Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 527 (1994).
200]
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- teaching the impact of other disciplines (e.g., psychology, economics,
technology) on the practice of law; and
- teaching an understanding of the law as a social institution.
As a result of this awareness, it became clear to many-including Judge
Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and former Chief Justice Warren Burger3°- -
that law school training was going to have to be critically restructured to
give students some sense of, in Llewellyn's words, "the problem of turning
legal or human knowledge into action."'"
Judge Frank's 1933 indictment of the Langdellian 32 method retains its
vigor today:
The lawyer-client relation, the numerous non-rational factors involved in a
trial, the face-to-face appeals to the emotions of juries, the elements that
go to make up what is loosely known as the "atmosphere" of a case-
everything that is undisclosed in upper-court opinions-was virtually un-
known to (and was therefore all but meaningless) to Langdell. The greater
part of the realities of the life of the average lawyer was unreal to him.33
To Frank, students trained under the Langdell system are like horticulturists
confining their studies to cut flowers, like architects who study pictures of
buildings and nothing else.34 As he succinctly stated: 'They resemble pro-
spective dog breeders who never see anything but stuffed dogs."35
In "real life," a practical lawyer has to be able to make reasonable deci-
sions, often with little or no guidance from anyone else. She has to be able to
depend on her own resources, and needs a vast number of practical skills at
her command to utilize quickly and decisively on demand. Further, a lawyer
must be able to interrelate her own values and emotions in appropriate ways:
a person cannot completely sever one's own personality from the context in
which that person functions, but must be able to operate in this context as a
practicing lawyer.
The case method forecloses almost totally the involvement of emotions,
as it emphasizes an abstract and intellectualized approach, heavy on verbali-
30. See generally Frank, supra note 17; Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56
YALE L.J. 1303 (1947); Karl Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education.35 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1935); Warren Burger, Some Further Reflections on the Adequacy of
Trial Counsel, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1980). On Chief Justice Burger's perspectives, see Jon
S. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1467-68
n.34 (1998); William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law
Professor: A View From the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 469-70 (1995).
31. Grossman, supra note 25, at 168 (citing Llewellyn, supra note 30, at 658).
32. This is the phrase that Professor Neumann prefers to "Socratic method." See Fried-
land, supra note 28, at I n.2 (quoting Neumann, supra note 27, at 728).
33. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 225-26
(2d ed. 1963).
34. See id. at 227.
35. Id. Frank's insights in this context are discussed in Maureen Laflin, Toward the Mak-
ing of Good Lawyers: How an Appellate Clinic Satisfies the Professional Objectives of the
MacCrate Report, 33 GONz. L. REV. 1, 29 (1997-98).
[Vol. 37
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 37 [2000], No. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss1/6
STEPPING OUTSIDE THE Box
zation and rationalization.36 This avoidance of emotions provides no oppor-
tunity for the development of emotional strength to deal with stress and to
deal with emotionally-significant situations.37
All attorney-client relationships involve, to some degree, human interac-
tion and emotional crises. The handling of these crises, for better or worse,
affects the relationship between the parties, the information-gathering proc-
ess, the development of trial strategies, and the case's outcome. These sim-
ply cannot be taught through the sole use of the case method. In short, while
the case approach can teach cognitive skills expertly, the learning process is
incomplete until the student can synthesize substantive concepts and meth-
ods into her actual performance in a real-life context.
I believe that there are at least five goals to which we, as legal educa-
tors, should strive:
1. to teach legal skills development;
2. to share legal and extra-legal system knowledge;
3. to promote professional responsibility growth;
4. to inspire self-knowledge; and
5. to increase human relations understanding.
I believe that sole reliance---or even a predominant reliance-on the case
method dooms us to failure in most of these enterprises.
I start with the assumption that a tremendously important portion of a
lawyer's work involves dealing with other people: listening to clients, devel-
oping a rapport with them, and educating and persuading judges, jurors, and
adversaries (and, in some public interest law cases, the public at large). Two
lawyers may be equally skillful in the substantive law, but the one who is
more skillful in interpersonal interactions will frequently be the true "suc-
cess."38 Being able to deal with other people requires an understanding of
psychological skills, and of how to meet the emotional and psychological
needs of others (including the client, the opponent, judges, jurors), and, not
unimportantly, the lawyer herself.39
36. See, e.g., Marjorie Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Law-
yer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 280 n.99 (1999), quoting Bernard L. Dia-
mond, Psychological Problems of Law Students, in LOOKING AT LAW SCHOOL 69-70 (Stephen
Gillers ed., 4th ed. 1997):
Certainly, if Anna Freud's principle of identification with the aggressor holds as
true for the educational process as it does for the developmental process of the
child, the Socratic method must provide the major source of the lawyer's notorious
insensitivity to the fine points of human emotional relationships. The Socratic
method is a marvelous device for the emphasis of the purely logical, abstract es-
sence of the appellate case. The deductive precision of such Socratic dialogue can
further the illusion, claimed by Langdell, that law is a true science.
37. See Gould & Perlin, supra note 14 (manuscript at 25, on file with authors).
38. By "success," I mean that she will be a better advocate and counselor, but I expect
that she will also be more successful in the material sense of the word as well.
39. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself- A Review of Empirical Research on At-
torney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997).
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Developing these skills requires several capacities: the capacity to be
open to new experiences; the capacity to be able to adjust responses and an-
ticipations on the basis of "new developments in an interaction";40 and the
capacity to be able to understand one's own feelings and fears as a lawyer.41
The best lawyer-counselors are those who recognize the elements of human
interaction in counseling, who are open to their clients, who respond to the
"whole person" of the client, and who help the client help herself. CPS
speaks directly to this precise issue. All too often, law school selection,
ethos, and training "trains out" these feelings and frequently suppresses hu-
manistic qualities in lawyers.42 The use of CPS methods, on the other hand,
will help nurture these skills and raise awareness of the use of a humanistic
approach to both legal education and the attorney-client relationship.
When the case method is unpacked, it reveals itself to be based on two
other assumptions that we rarely critique: as I've already suggested, the as-
sumption of neutral principles, and the assumption of rationality. Neither of
these assumptions comports with anything we have learned in the past cen-
tury from cognitive, social, or behavioral psychology, yet we slavishly re-
peat these shibboleths and we convince our students that this is "the way it
is."
43
My major area of scholarly interest is mental disability law. For the past
several years, I've been writing mostly about what I call sanism and what I
call pretextuality.44 What do I mean by the terms "sanism" and "pretextual-
ity"? Simply put, "sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and
character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) pre-
vailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry. It
infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. Sanism is largely
invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon
stereotype, myth, superstition and de-individualization, and is sustained and
perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS) and heu-
40. In football jargon, the ability to "call an audible."
41. I remember my shock when I was a boy and read that both the comedian Red Skelton
and the hockey goalie Jacques Plante admitted to vomiting before every live perform-
ance/game.
42. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 36, at 288; James A. Elkins, A Humanistic Perspective in
Legal Education, 62 NEB. L. REv. 494, 505-08 (1983); Jack Himmelstein, Reassessing Law
Schooling: An Inquiry into the Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the
Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 546-47 (1978).
43. Cf Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Isanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 731 (1989-90) ("[U]ntil we acknowl-
edge the staying power and the universality of these myths [about the insanity defense], we
are doomed to a jurisprudence that will proceed on the same blind path that we have followed
for the past two hundred fifty years: one developed out of consciousness.").
44. See PERLIN, supra note 20; Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped
Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEG. Iss. 3 (1999); Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Under-
standing the Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994).
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ristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life
and in the legal process.'
"Pretextuality" means that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly)
testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently meretri-
cious) decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially expert wit-
nesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order
to achieve desired ends."4 This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all par-
ticipants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law,
demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and at
times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying. 7
I believe it is impossible for mental disability law students to even begin
to come to grips with these issues using a solely case-based teaching meth-
odology.4'
Professor Janeen Kerper's provocative and excellent recent article on
the shortcomings of the case method (looking mostly through the lens of the
Palsgraf case) explains how CPS-premised on a collaborative enterprise-
can better allow lawyers to provide more effective solutions to client prob-
lems, and to help clients avoid conflict in the first instance. '9
She notes perceptively that the case method-which teaches students to
think like appellate judges-blunts the abilities of students to understand
that "their available options are greater, and therefore their own thought
processes can be much broader"' if we use alternatives to a strictly case-
based pedagogy. And I agree.
45. See Michael L. Perlin, supra note 12, at 374-75. See generally Michael L. Perlin, The
ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone? 8 J. L. &
HEALTH 15 (1993-94) (arguing that even in the best cases, the problems presented by pretex-
tual decision-making affect social and legal discourse concerning mentally ill individuals);
Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of
"Mitigating" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL. 239
(1994).
46. Charles Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
839, 840 (1974), cited in Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success like Failure/and Failure's
No Success at All": Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REv.
1247, 1252 n.35 (1998).
47. See Perlin, supra note 46, at 1252. See also generally Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts
and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 627-30
(1993); Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary
Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY& L. 131 (1991).
48. See generally Gould & Perlin, supra note 14 (advocating the integration of Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence into a clinical legal education).
This is interesting: when I discuss the basic inability of students to grasp issues using case-
based teaching with colleagues and friends who teach immigration law, or elder law, or sex
discrimination law, or bankruptcy law, they often say, "That's exactly how it is in my field
too." I expect that this is an insight worthy of further exploration.
49. See Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. the Case Method: A Marvelous Ad-
venture in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 351 (1998).
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In short, continued devotion to a solely (or disproportionately predomi-
nantly) case-method basis of legal education keeps us "in the box," and in-
hibits us from expanding our array of options in a way that would benefit our
students, our clients, and ourselves.
III. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN HOW WE LEARN AND WHAT WE Do
I think there's even more to all of this than simply a critique of teaching
styles. I say that because I am convinced that the way we teach shapes not
only the way that our students learn the law, but also how they practice law.
Furthermore, I am persuaded that this connection has far-reaching results in
terms of the quality of law that is practiced, the way the rest of the world
perceives us, and, not insignificantly, the level of satisfaction that lawyers
have with their profession and, ultimately, with their lives.
Intuitively, we know that the way we learn anything has a major impact
on the way we do what it is we learn. Think about the way your sports coach
coached you or the way your music instructor shaped the lessons. Then think
about how that translated-for better or worse-into the kind of basketball
player or clarinetist you turned into. More to the point: think about how
therapists are trained and how that training affects-perhaps predeter-
mines-the way that therapy is practiced. Think about the difference between
a therapist who learns primarily the different chemical properties of the ma-
jor phenothiazine drugs, and the one who is taught about a variety of thera-
peutic interventions. Then, finally, think about how that affects what goes on
in the therapeutic session.
I was struck, in Professor Kerper's article, by her references to John De-
laney's 1983 book.52 Consider what Professor Delaney, who taught at NYU
at the time he wrote this book, had to say by way of advice for first year law
students:
To understand what you do in the first year. of law school, it may
help to know what you will not do.
You will not participate in lengthy class explorations of:
-justice and the requirements of a just society
- abstract philosophical and ethical questions
- economic and sociological theories
- social science research methods, reports and data
- political issues .53
Perhaps these areas are not discussed in Professor Delaney's classes, but
they certainly are in mine. These subjects are explored not just in my Mental
Health Law classes, but in my Civil Procedure classes, my Criminal Proce-
dure classes, and my Criminal Law classes. For I believe that if we do not
52. See id. at 358.
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discuss each of these broad themes, we are shortchanging our students as
law students, as lawyers, and as societal decision-makers.
Professor Thomas Barton has articulated what he sees as the central
theme of CPS:
Legal solutions traditionally are instrumental, relying on both power
and truth to fashion rules that attempt to conform social environments
to the purposes of a person or group. In part, the aim of creative prob-
lem solving is to make law a more sensitive and respectful shaper of
the social, physical and relational environment. Further, however,
creative problem solving seeks to give lawyers the understanding,
skills, and attitudes needed to apply tools of persuasion and recon-
ciliation where that may be more appropriate. 54
Just as CPS is a tool to make the law "a more sensitive and respectful
shaper of the social, physical and relational environment," so too can it be a
tool to make legal education a more "sensitive and respectful shaper..."
And, in this way, it will sensitize our students-and our colleagues-to the
potential range of choices before us.
IV. APPLICATION OF CPS TO TEACHING
So, how can CPS be applied to the teaching enterprise? Again, Professor
Kerper has articulated some of the basic thoughts in her essay, but I have a
few additional ideas that I believe are totally complimentary to what she has
already set out. I believe CPS allows us-perhaps, forces us-to look at
what happened before the "critical moment" that-purportedly-led to the
filing of the law suit, what happened after the suit was concluded, and to
consider "players" not on the "playing field" at the moment of litigation.
We know from thirty years of writing and research about class actions
and public interest law that many of the most important legal disputes in our
society are polycentric. The "Al v. Barbara" traffic accident that is at the
heart of the methodology of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure55 in no way
reflects the complexity of much modem litigation.56 I supplement the class
action materials in my Civil Procedure course, in fact, with the case of Men-
doza v. United States,' the Tucson school district desegregation case. I do
this in order to show my class how multiple interests-pitting white parents
against African-American parents against Mexican-American parents (and
then, subsequently, pitting one group of Mexican-American parents, in-
censed because the school in their neighborhood were targeted for closure,
54. Thomas Barton, Creative Problem Solving: Purpose, Meaning, and Values, 34 CAL.
W. L. REV. 273,274 (1998).
55. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P., Form 9.
56. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1281, 1284, 1313-16 (1976) (discussing polycentricity of much public interest litiga-
tion).
57. 623 F.2d 1338 (9" Cir. 1980).
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against other Mexican-American parents who were originally members of
the same class)---navigate the shoals of complex litigation. But the issue is
not really the question of the test to be used in determining when sub-classes
are appropriate under Federal Rule 23; the issue is the extent to which legal
solutions-appellate legal solutions alone-can really meaningfully solve
the underlying social, political, cultural and psychic issues.
When I directed the Federal Litigation Clinic, I used to present my stu-
dents with what is called the "nine dot problem": " how many lines does it
take to connect all the dots in this nine-dot puzzle?
Clearly, it takes some CPS strategies to solve this one. It always seemed
to me that those students who could use their right brain and go out of the
box (literally, and that is the real reason for the title of my article) eventually
adapted better to the non-case-based methodologies used in the clinical set-
ting.
One of the courses I teach is Therapeutic Jurisprudence (TJ) 9 Thera-
peutic jurisprudence studies the role of the law as a therapeutic agent, recog-
nizing that substantive rules, legal procedures, and lawyers' roles may have
either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. In addition, TJ questions
whether such rules, procedures and roles can or should be reshaped so as to
enhance their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due process
principles. Therapeutic jurisprudence looks at a variety of mental disability
58. See EDWARD DE BONO, LATERAL THINKING 95-97 (1990). De Bono characterizes this
as an "old problem." Id. at 95. I first remember seeing it on placemats during my many hours
drinking bad coffee at all-night diners in central New Jersey in the early-mid 1960's. See also
Brest & Krieger, supra note 29, at 538 ("Many people are unable to solve the puzzle because
they unconsciously draw boundaries around the situation presented and thus limit the range of
permissible solutions."); The Puzzle of Sparking Inspiration (visited April 29, 2000)
<http://www.creativelivingmagazine.com/96wi/solving.html>; University of Oklahoma,
Course Description of Creative Problem Solving, Human Relations 5072-225 (visited April
29, 2000) <http:lwww.ou.edulap/syllabi/summer99/DR5072SH.HTM>.
59. See generally THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT
(David Wexler ed., 1990) (asserting that the study of law as a therapeutic agent can help
shape the law and provoke insights in many fields of study besides the law, including public
health, criminal justice, psychiatry, and philosophy); ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(David Wexler & Bruce Winick eds. 1991); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David Wexler & Bruce Winick eds. 1996);
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Bruce Winick ed.,
1998) (examining therapeutic jurisprudence's goal of applying social science to study the ef-
fect of law on the physical and mental health of the people affected by the law); David Wex-
ler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992); David Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APP'L. &
PREVEN. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996); David Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Juris-
prudence, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 220 (1995); 1 PERLIN, supra note 12, § 2D-3, at 534-
41; Bibliography of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 915 (1993).
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law issues-and other legal issues-in an effort to both shed new light on
past developments and to offer new insights for future developments.
In an article that I have co-authored with Professor Keri Gould-
"Johnny's in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine": Therapeutic Juris-
prudence and Clinical Teaching-we spent some time thinking about how
TJ could be used in the clinical or workshop teaching areas.' We concluded
that there were at least four ways in which TJ could enrich clinical teaching:
' TJ informs our teaching of skills, gives us a better understanding of the dy-
namics of clinical relationships, investigates ethical concerns and the effect
on lawyering roles, and invigorates the way we as teachers and students
question accepted legal practice."" Each of these is, I think, relevant to the
thesis of this article.
Of course, we must be cognizant of the differing abilities inherent in our
classroom audiences. Students "'get' clinical skills at very different levels of
understanding: some appear born to it; some learn, absorb and eventually
make these skills a part of their 'lawyering unconscious'; some learn enough
to mechanistically spout the right words and express the right emotions
(while internally resisting); and some will have none of it."'62 Utilizing TJ can
help us understand why this is, why some students seem to be "unable" to
learn certain lawyering skills and why some may require different teaching
approaches.63 It can also be a powerful tool for understanding the compli-
cated interpersonal dynamics inherent in clinical relationships: those of stu-
dent-client, student-professor, student-student, student-significant other, and
student-predecessor/student-successor." Additionally, TJ can be of great
value as we try to understand the impact of intra-psychic and interpersonal
stress on the enterprise of legal learning.'
Furthermore, TJ can be of tremendous worth in the way we weigh the
multiple ethical issues we face in clinical education, issues that are inextri-
cably intertwined with subissues of power, class, race, gender and differ-
ence.' It belabors the obvious to point out that the case method has no room
for any of these. Therapeutic jurisprudence allows us-perhaps, it forces
us-to take a hard look at the impact of these issues on students' well-being
in their role as clinical participants. I believe its "fit" with CPS has the po-
tential to "jump start" any future inquiries in this area.67
60. Gould & Perlin, supra note 14.
61. Id. (manuscript at 22, on file with authors).
62. Id.
63. See id (manuscript at 23 & n.95, on file with authors).
64. See id. (manuscript at 23-24 & nn.96-97, on file with authors).
65. See id. (manuscript at 24, on file with authors). See also David Wexler, Reflections
on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 220, 228 (1995);
David Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies,
67 Ray. JUR. U.P.R. 317, 332 (1998) (commenting on the relationship between TJ and lawyer
stress).
66. See Gould & Perlin, supra note 14 (manuscript at 27, on file with authors).
67. On the relationship between TJ and CPS, see Thomas Barton, Therapeutic Jurispru-
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In what I think is one of the most important law review pieces of the last
several years, Professor Susan Daicoff ponders whether there is room for
what she calls an "ethic of care" either in legal education or in law practice. 68
Her research tells us what some of us have intuitively assumed, and what
talk show hosts on TV have had no doubt about for many years: 69 "That at-
torneys and persons choosing to attend law school have specific empirically-
demonstrable personality characteristics, and that these characteristics are
partially responsible for the current crisis in the legal profession." 70 1 think if
Professor Daicoff's work is re-read with one eye on the CPS literature, we
can gain new insights into the relationship between lawyer dissatisfaction,
client dissatisfaction, and the way we teach and learn in law school.7'
Professor Ann Iijima has written recently about law school's interfer-
ence with students' "maintenance and development of interconnections [and]
their intra-connections---emotional, spiritual, and physical," and how law
school leads students to "suppress their feelings and come to care less about
others." '72 She concludes that the law school environment "encourages emo-
tional dysfunction in students even as it isolates them from the people and
activities that are essential to the maintenance of a healthy emotional
state."'73 She focuses on the case method as a major culprit in all of this and
offers a variety of prescriptive recommendations.74 Every word Professor Ii-
jima writes fits comfortably into the mode of CPS.
One of the basic principles of first-year Criminal Law is the concept of
"willful blindness." A defendant may be guilty of a crime if he "suspected
the fact; he realized its probability; but he refrained from obtaining the final
confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowl-
edge."75 When I teach the principle to my class, I distribute a Herblock car-
dence, Preventive Law, and Creative Problem Solving: An Essay on Harnessing Emotion and
Human Connection, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 921 (1999).
68. See Daicoff, supra note 39, at 1401-02.
On the "ethic of care," see, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of
Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1176 (1992); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate
Report-Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593, 620
(1994). 1 believe the phrase was first used in CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
69. See Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 407 (2000) ("Talk
show hosts in need of a quick laugh can always rely on a lawyer-bashing story.").
70. Daicoff, supra note 39, at 1342.
71. See Perlin, supra note 69, at 410 (commenting on the crisis facing lawyers and their
profession as discussed in Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should
Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems With Professionalism by Reference to
Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 547
(1998)). Daicoff, to my mind, is one of the few academics who really has important and
original thoughts about these questions.
72. Iijima, supra note 7, at 529.
73. Id. at 530.
74. See id. at 532-38.
75. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 n.7 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting GLANVILLE
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, § 57 at 159 (2d ed. 1961)).
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toon from the 1980's of Ronald Reagan. Reagan has his hands over his eyes,
and while an advisor places in front of him the authorization for the arms-
for-hostages deal to sign he says, "Let me guess-It's a proclamation for
National Apple Pie Week?"' The students, by and large, get it, but I am not
sure that "we" (the law school faculty) "get it" when the question before us
is our continuing failure to think seriously about how the process of legal
education leads our students into making assumptions (and misassumptions)
about both the legal process and the act of lawyering. I believe that our col-
lective willful blindness on this issue is toxic. It harms the teaching enter-
prise, the learning enterprise, and, ultimately, the way that law is practiced
and clients represented. It is an issue that cries out for further attention.
Finally, I believe that the application of CPS methods in law school will
help maximize the likelihood that students, when they actually practice law,
will be able to adapt a more holistic role of lawyering," and not see them-
selves as just part of an appellate case law mechanism. In his fascinating
piece on law and architecture, Jamie Cooper talks about how holistic lawyer-
ing (along with TJ and other new approaches) all fit comfortably under the
CPS umbrella.78 I think his insights are absolutely right, and we need to take
them very seriously as we continue with this enterprise.
V. CONCLUSION
In short, I think CPS is an extremely important tool, both for the prac-
tice of law and for the enterprise of teaching law. I believe that the methods
we use in class have an impact far beyond whether our students can harmo-
nize disparate holdings, shape legal appellate arguments, or "think like law-
yers" (which really means, "think like we were taught to think when we
were in law school being taught by professors who taught us how to think in
the way they were taught to think when they were in law school, etc."). I also
believe that the type and quality of law our students practice depends to a
great extent on what we do in the classroom.
If CPS helps us to step outside the box and restructure the way we do
that, then we truly will have taken major steps in the transformation of legal
education, and that will have been a very good thing indeed.
76. MiCHAEL L. PERLIN, SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (2000)
(mimeographed).
77. See Perlin, supra note 69, at 418 (discussing holistic law). See also id. n.74 (citing
William van Zyverden, Holistic Lawyering: A Comprehensive Approach to Dispute Resolu-
tion, 3 B.U. PUB. iNT. L.J. 5, 5 (1993)).
78. See James Cooper, Towards a New Architecture: Creative Problem Solving and the
Evolution of Law, 34 CAL. W. L. Rnv. 297, 314 (1998).
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